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This article examines the relationship between social media, political mobilization, and 
civic engagement in the context of the 2014 student protests in Venezuela. The study 
investigates whether these technologies were used by participants as a catalyst to 
trigger the protests and amplify them across the country or whether they were a 
galvanizing factor among more general conditions. The analysis uses cultural chaos and 
virality/contagion as theoretical approaches to discuss these events to provoke 
discussion about the relationship between protests and social media. However, far from 
a techno-deterministic assumption that sees social media as somehow having agency in 
itself, the authors highlight the role of social media as a platform for political 
engagement through imitation and emotions while rejecting false dichotomies of 
rationality/irrationality among the crowd. 
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Introduction 
 
After the death of President Hugo Chávez in 2013, Nicolás Maduro was elected president of 
Venezuela by a slim majority in a contested election (Sagarzazu, 2014). Maduro inherited a fragile 
economy in which deteriorating public finances met with widespread shortages of basic goods, high 
inflation, general power cuts, and growing rates of violent crime (Kurmanaev & Russo, 2014; Pons, 2014). 
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The situation came to a head in 2014, when students and other segments of society took to the streets to 
protest against the government (Chinea & Ore, 2014; Robertson, 2014)²a situation that government 
officials referred to as guarimbas (Vargas, 2015)²a slogan that is often used to refer to vandalism 
perpetrated by anarchist groups. 
 
This article examines the relationship between social media, political mobilization, and civic 
engagement in the context of the 2014 student protests in Venezuela. The authors ask whether these 
technologies were used by leaders and participants as a catalyst to trigger the protests and amplify them 
across the country or whether they were a galvanizing factor among more general conditions. Following 
similar research that FODLPV WKDW YLUDO PHGLD KDYH SOD\HG D NH\ UROH LQ 6SDLQ¶V indignados movement 
(Postill, 2014), we use virality/contagion (Sampson, 2012) and cultural chaos (McNair, 2006) as 
theoretical approaches to analyze these events while examining their limitations and shortcomings in the 
context of the Venezuelan society.  
 
We start by contesting techno-deterministic claims that see the use of these technologies as 
pivotal in instigating these protests. Alternatively, our findings suggest that if the technologies were used 
to coordinate protest efforts by some of the student leaders, their most important role was nevertheless to 
IDFLOLWDWH D PLPHWLF HIIHFW DPRQJ WKH PDQ\ RU ZKDW LV UHIHUUHG WR LQ FXOWXUDO VWXGLHV DV ³FRQWDJLRQ´
(Sampson, 2012, p. 159) that took placHLQWKHFRQWH[WRID³FXOWXUDOFKDRV´0F1DLUIRVWHUHGE\D
QHZ ³PHGLD HFRORJ\´ 6WUDWH  7KH FRQFHSW RI PHGLDLQIRUPDWLRQ HFRORJLHV KDV EHHQ XVHG DV D
theoretical explanatory framework by some authors (Dahlberg-Grundberg, 2015; Rinke & Röder, 2011; 
Treré, 2012) to study protests and student movements and collectives. Emiliano Treré, for example, 
highlights the coevolutionary nature of these ecologies, in which actors learn and adapt as a group, and 
Michael Dahlberg-Grundberg on the Arab Spring underlines from his own data how some modern social 
movements and their technological keystones may work according to hybrid logics in the context of these 
ecologies.  
 
Following these works, we also conceptualize the phenomenon of reproduction and rapid 
dissemination of the protests in Venezuela in terms of coevolution and hybridity. Our thesis is that this 
OHDUQLQJ DQG DGDSWDWLRQ KDSSHQHG LQ SDUDOOHO WR GLIIHUHQW ORJLFV :H WKLQN KRZHYHU WKDW SURWHVWHUV¶
learning and adaptation occurred as a process of imitation. To investigate this thesis, we used a mixed-
methods approach, which included triangulating semi-structured interviews and content analysis of the 
media. The findings suggest that social media did not trigger these events, although the data do underline 
that they were used to orchestrate protests and as channels of communication among protesters. The 
findings also indicate that social media was used as a collective non-geographical space for imitation.  
 
This contagion effect, in our view, was very powerful in orchestrating mobilization as protesters 
came out not necessarily to engage with the political agenda of the leaders promoting the protests but to 
mimic the behavior of others. Protests in Venezuela are common²although usually not as widespread as 
they were in 2014²HYHQDPRQJ+XJR&KiYH]¶VVXSSRUWHUVZKHQKHZDVVWLOO LQSRZHUDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶V
public finances were in better shape than they are nowadays. Therefore, these types of protests cannot be 
narrowly seen in binary terms of government versus opposition nor in terms of traditional political 
rationality but rather as a social practice linked to freedom of expression (Gargarella, 2008). Protests in 
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Venezuela traditionally have been used to highlight issues that liberal institutions have not addressed. The 
fact that people protest does not mean that they are not supportive of the government or that they have 
engaged somehow with the political agenda of the opposition (Cañizález, 2013a) but simply that they are 
trying to become visible to and connect with those in power.  
 
The Protests and the Students 
 
There is little that indicates the existence of a structured student movement capable of mobilizing 
ODUJH VHJPHQWV RI WKH SRSXODWLRQ LQ 9HQH]XHOD 0RUHRYHU VRPH RI WKHVH VWXGHQWV¶ PRYHPHQWV DUH
appendixes of the political parties in opposition (Sosa, 2014). Indeed, most of the student protests came 
from both the national autonomous²not managed by the central government²and private universities, 
both with little Chavista support given the social background of students. The suggestion is that there is a 
class element in the interplay as the protests were led by middle- and upper-class individuals who have 
seen a deterioration in their life standards and traditional entitlements (VenEconomia, 2005) and who 
have been at the core of the opposition to the government (Ito Cerón, 2014). 
 
+RZHYHU ZH DOVR TXHVWLRQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V FRQVSLUDF\ QDUUDWLYH WKDW WKH SURWHVWV ZHUH
orchestrated efforts by the right to overthrow the government (TeleSUR tv, 2014), even though there is 
clear evidence of past involvement of the opposition to do that in 2002 (Hernández, 2004; Lugo & 
Romero, 2002±2003). However, there is no hard evidence that these protests were part of a wider plan 
against Nicolás Maduro; nor did the extent of these protests make it likely that they were somehow part of 
a coordinated effort funded by foreign powers (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, 2014b; Nikandrov, 2014), 
because it is unlikely that these forces had that capacity to mobilize people to such an extent.  
 
On the contrary, participation in these protests was mostly spontaneous. As such, they became 
spaces in which discontent converged but in ways that not only reflected frustration toward the curtailing 
of middle-class liberal aspirations but expressed the type of struggles for social rights that had been seen 
in the past from workers unions. The students were able to galvanize the discontent regarding shortages 
of food in the supermarkets, limitations in housing provisions, crime, inflation, and job prospects while 
reflecting the anger against diminishing liberal entitlements among the middle class. 
 
3URWHVWVKDYHRIWHQEHHQGHILQHGDV³VLWHVRIFRQWHVWDWLRQV LQZKLFKERGLHVV\PEROV LGHQWLWLHV
SUDFWLFHV DQG GLVFRXUVHV DUH XVHG WR SXUVXH RU SUHYHQW FKDQJHV LQ LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG SRZHU UHODWLRQV´
(Taylor & van Dyke, 2004, p. 268). As such, they are spaces of temporary convergence of resistance, 
discontent, and overall power in which the individual becomes part of what historically has been called the 
³FURZG´ &DQHWWL  Le Bon, 1895/2003; Ortega y Gasset, 1930/1966). This crowd can exercise 
collectively power in ways in which the individual cannot. 
 
:HDOVR LGHQWLI\ZLWK WKHFRQFHSWRISURWHVWV WKURXJK-RKQ'HZH\¶VQRWLRQRI³WKH
SXEOLF´ ZKLFKFRPHVLQWRH[LVWHQFHE\LWVDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKDparticular set of issues. Accordingly, protests 
happen as a consequence of inadequate institutional channels to either address the issue or hear the 
voices of discontent. The weaker the institutional channels are, the greater the likelihood of protests 
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taking place in a liberal democracy. Therefore, the lack of credibility and trust in liberal institutions is a 
powerful encouragement for protests to happen (Levi & Stoker, 2000). 
 
In the case of Latin America some important studies have examined the protests (López Maya, 
1999; Machado, Scartascini, & Tommasi, 2011; Yashar, 2005). Most of these works have focused on how 
protests have affected politics and how they link with transnational resistance movements against the 
power of the elites and the imposition of neoliberal policy. Other studies have looked at how these 
UHVLVWDQFH PRYHPHQWV DUWLFXODWHG WKH SRZHU EDVH IRU WRGD\¶V OHIW-wing governments (Arditi, 2009). 
+RZHYHUDV6XVDQ(FNVWHLQKDVSRLQWHGRXW³QHLWKHUSROLWLFDOVFLHQFHSDUDGLJPVRIUHJLPH types 
nor theories of social movement have been able to adequately explain why segments of the population at 
WLPHVJRRXWDQGSURWHVWZKLOHRWKHUVVWD\DWKRPH´S,WLVDFRQXQGUXPWRZKLFK$QWRQLR*UDPVFL
(1950/1996) dedicated much work. 
 
To problematize this issue further, student protests present a series of elements that are based 
on class assumptions. First, most students in higher education are of either the upper or middle classes 
(Leher, 2010). Despite this, most studies on student protests haYHKLJKOLJKWHGWKH³YDQJXDUG´VWDWXVWKDW
these movements enjoy within the public imaginary in terms of both resistance and contesting to power. 
The overall role of student protests have been studied in the past. From the seminal work of Jürgen 
Habermas (1WR6LQJHU¶VH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKH)UHQFK0D\RIWRPRUHUHFHQWZRUNV
on China (Calhoun, 1997). In all these studies, student protests have been presented as an element that 
challenges those in power. 
 
Venezuela also has a history of student protests against power. This includes the 1928 student 
movement against the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez (Arellano, 1988; de Sucre & Mendoza, 1967; 
Figueroa, 2008), the incorporation of students into the guerrilla warfare of the 1960s (Tarver, Angulo & 
Loaiza, 2004), and the student protests against the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s (Pérez-
Liñán, 2008). Precisely because of the role of students against the dictatorship, the constitution of 1961 
awarded most national universities autonomy from central government, which also prohibited police and 
military forces from entering their grounds (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, 2014a). Indeed, the history 
RIVWXGHQWV¶SURWHVWVLQ9HQH]XHODKDVEHHQPDLQO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKDQGFRQVWUDLQHGZLWKLn these university 
spaces.  
 
This conceptualization of student protests as spatial realities²in which discontent is able to 
converge and express itself as radical contestation of power²is pivotal in understanding why and how 
social media has been incorporated into these protests. This notion suggests that the use of social media 
allowed the projection of influence and power beyond the physical boundaries of university autonomic 
spaces. It also indicates that it was technology that allowed these protests to spread across the country. 
 
Contagion Effect 
 
Although only 40% of the population in Venezuela has permanent access to the Internet 
(Tendencias Digitales, 2012), students were able to project their message of discontent widely because 
they had the resources and knowledge to access social media (Sádaba, Bringué, & Calderín, 2011) in a 
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scenario in which mobile devices had become the main communication platforms for access (Bonina & Illa, 
 DQG GHVSLWH WUDGLWLRQDO ³PDLQVWUHDP QHZV PHGLD EHLQJ QRZ Rverwhelmingly controlled by or 
H[WUHPHO\VXVFHSWLEOHWRJRYHUQPHQWSRZHU´&DxL]iOH]S6WXGHQWVXVLQJVRFLDOPHGLDDFWHG
DV ³RSLQLRQ OHDGHUV´ 6FKUDPP  DOORZLQJ GLIIHUHQW HOHPHQWV WR FRQYHUJH DQG WR SURGXFH
unexpected outcomes; in other words, creating a media ecology that unleashed the destabilizing impact of 
digital communication technologies (McNair, 2006). 
 
Paradoxically, it was under Hugo Chávez that Venezuela increased its access to the Internet and 
made the use of social media a priority (EFE, 2011; Martínez & Rico Díaz, 2104). Politically speaking, this 
was done to offer alternative spaces beyond the traditional mainstream media, which, at the time, was 
mostly controlled by the opposition and economic elites (Lugo & Romero, 2002±2003). The strategy was 
directed at increasing public presence of pro-government voices, social organizations, and citizens in the 
public sphere to counterbalance the then hegemony of the privately owned media. It was under Chávez 
that political struggles ZHUHWDNHQWRWKHYLUWXDOVSDFH³HVSHFLDOO\DIWHUWKHFRXSLQ$SULO´/R]DGD
2004, p. 170), which highlighted how vulnerable the government was in relation to connecting and 
mobilizing with its supporters. 
 
Due to these policies, the novelty of the technologies, and a marked increase in the average 
income of the population, Venezuela saw an exponential growth of almost 300% in the number of Internet 
users (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias F ³2QH RI WKH PRVW DYLG JURXSV LQ DGRSWLQJ WKHVH
technologies were the nongovernmental organizations and other groups often associated with the so-
FDOOHGFLYLOVRFLHW\´8UULEDUUtS1HYHUWKHOHVVDFFRUGLQJ5DLVD8UULEDUUtDUHVHDUFKHULQ
the area, there were already important indications of the intention of the government to control these 
spaces and other problems derived from the expansion of the user base: 
 
If between the years 2000 and 2011 the state in Venezuela developed a set of programs 
and public policies directed at increasing access to the Web²going from a penetration of 
3.38% to 36.57%²LW LV DOVR LPSRUWDQW WR KLJKOLJKW WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V RZQ
communication conglomerate, CANTV, literally monopolizes the Internet provision by 
controlling over 90% of the market with an average speed of less than a megabyte per 
second (1Mbps). The tragic paradox is that while the number of people connected grow, 
the quality of the Internet connection has deteriorated. All this while the government 
increases its grip of the net. (p. 50) 
 
During this time, pro-JRYHUQPHQW YRLFHV VWDUWHG WR WDON DERXW WKH QHHG IRU ³D QHZ PHGLD
KHJHPRQ\´ &DxL]iOH]ES WKDW FRXOG FRXQWHUEDODQFHZKDW WKH\ VDZDV FRXQWHUUHYROXWLRQDU\
movements orchestrated by the right-wing sectors. These pro-government voices specifically refer to the 
articulation of a general communication strategy that would use social media to create alternative spaces 
of communication and propaganda (Venezolana de Televisión, 2013). By the time the protests broke out, 
the media ecology was dense with new voices and channels. 
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The Spark 
 
The first protests took place in the cities of Mérida and San Cristóbal in the southwest of 
Venezuela (López Maya, 2014). After the assassination of student Bassil Alejandro Da Costa on February 
12, 2014, the SURWHVWV VSUHDG WRRWKHUFLWLHV'D&RVWD¶VGHDWKZDV UHFRUGHGDQGXSORDGHG WR<RX7XEH
(Ramírez, 2014), becoming a viral phenomenon. Seeing this cold-blooded killing in an environment in 
which people identified with the students led to mass protests. What followed, in our view, reflects the 
SKHQRPHQRQRI³FRQWDJLRQE\HPSDWK\´6DPSVRQSLQZKLFKWKHUHZDVQRWRQO\HPSDWK\
toward Da Costa and his family but deep resentment against the government. Regarding this view, 
journalist and blogger Luis Carlos Díaz, commented: 
 
There was an emotional break between the government and large segments of the 
younger population who say on You Tube how presumably members of the secret 
service, Sebin, shot in cold blood that students. It was an emotional moment that I 
would personally best describe as the moment that young people in Venezuela, 
particularly in certain segments, loss their innocence. It was then and there that they 
realize that traditional channels would not work for them and that they were indeed 
facing a different type of regime. (personal communication, November 11, 2014) 
 
$FFRUGLQJ WR VRPH HVWLPDWHV ³RYHU  SHRSOHZHQW WR WKH VWUHHWV´ 8]FDWHJXL  S
7KLVEHFDPHRQHRIWKHODUJHVWVWXGHQWPRELOL]DWLRQVLQ9HQH]XHOD¶VUHFHQWhistory, and, according to 
most polls at the time, it had wide support from the general public, who saw the protests as legitimate 
(Instituto Venezolano de Análisis de Datos, 2014). In the face of this public support, the government 
found it impossible to downplay the protests. Instead, the government opted to disfranchise those 
participating in the protests by criminalizing the students and presenting the protests in the official 
narratives as guarimbas (Venezolana de Televisión, 2014). According to Amnesty International (2014), 
dozens of students were incarcerated and hundreds were injured in the crackdown that followed. 
 
The government has repeatedly claimed that the student protests were orchestrated by the 
opposition with the support of the United States to overthrow Maduro (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, 
2014b), and certainly there is evidence that some of the leaders of these protests were heavily involved 
with the party politics of the opposition (Konducta, 2014). Nevertheless, the size of these events leaves no 
doubt that more complex factors were at play. Similar protests in the past were confined to the autonomic 
areas of the universities or their adjacencies, but this was the first time that this type of protest spread so 
widely among so many different segments of society. It is this multiplying effect that calls for further 
analysis. Why were so many people drawn into these protests? Why were these protests able to transcend 
the small geographical autonomic areas of the universities for the first time? Moreover, given the 
OLPLWDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV¶EDFNJURXQGVDQGWKHQDWXUHRIWKHLURYHUDOOSROLWLFDOGLVFRXUVHKRZZHUH
they able to reach out to so many people simultaneously? 
 
Research has pointed to austerity programs, decreasing living standards, and police brutality as 
having a pivotal role in triggering these types of events (Newburn, 2011). For example, the United 
Kingdom saw similar protests in Bristol in 1980 and in Brixton (London) and Toxteth (Liverpool) in 1981. 
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All cases involved decreasing living standards, racial discrimination, and police brutality. However, none of 
these events transcended relatively small geographical areas in the United Kingdom. The difference 
between these previous events and the 2011 London riots²which spread simultaneously across many 
cities in the United Kingdom²was, according to some authors, the new media ecology. This allowed for 
protesters to connect with occurring events and with one another across the country while bringing into 
SOD\VLPXOWDQHRXVO\DVHULHVRIHOHPHQWVDQGHYHQWV³FROOHFWLYHLQWHOOLJHQFH´/pY\	%RQRPRDQG
shared political imaginaries. This research has recognized the role that social media played in amplifying 
these types of events (Dant & Richards, 2011). Accordingly, the new media ecology became a medium in 
which various elements galvanized to foster the imitating of political actions in terms of contagion/virality.  
 
Scholars such as Henry Jenkins have nevertheless criticized the metaphor of virality, suggesting 
to use instead the term spreadability because it recognizes human agency (Usher, 2010). Nonetheless, we 
continue to adopt the term virality in our own work, because for us agency does not necessarily translate 
to control²not even to individual control. Contrary to Jenkins, we see virality as an argumentative 
metaphor, which implies human agency/intervention, although not necessarily the ability to control or set 
direction to protests as social practice. The use of the term virality as an argumentative provocation 
implies that the messages can take on a life of their own with the sole purpose of surviving and thriving in 
the new media ecology²something that does not preclude human agency. 
 
Spreading the Word 
 
We find the logics of virality useful, particularly in relation to the formation of the crowd and in 
the context of contagion, because: 
 
The chaotic rhythm of contagious encounter is indeed easy to observe but not so easy to 
control. Certainly, unlike the assumed substance of the memetic unit, the incorporeal 
material of affective contagion has a distinct ungraspability. (Sampson, 2012, p. 95) 
 
Sampson and other scholars (Borch, 2006; Nye, 1973) have been clear in their own work about 
the tendency of early authors such as Gabriel Tarde (1843±1904), Gustave Le Bon (1841±1931), and José 
Ortega y Gasset, (1883±1955) to psychologize participative social movements. They also remind us of 
7DUGH¶V DQG /H %RQ¶V GLVGDLQ WRZDUG WKH FURZGV WKH\ VDZ WKHP DV WKH ³PDVVHV´ RI ORZHU-class urban 
dwellers with little rationality and acting on primal instincts. Moreover, generations of social movement 
scholars have produced a comprehensive critique against both Tarde and Le Bon and have written 
extensively about alternative explanations.  
 
Nevertheless, we believe that the exponential growth of the student protests in Venezuela can be 
examined using the laws of repeWLWLRQDQGDGDSWDWLRQ:HDOVRWKLQN/H%RQ¶VPHQWDOXQLW\SULQFLSDOLVVWLOO
YDOLGDVDWRROIRUVFUXWLQL]LQJKRZWKHFURZG³DEVRUEVWKHLQGLYLGXDOVLQWRWKHVXJJHVWLELOLW\RIWKHPDQ\´
6DPSVRQS$FFRUGLQJ WR /H%RQ¶V PHQWDO XQLW\RI WKHFURZGV¶ SULQFLSOH²or 
meme: 
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Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an 
agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those of the 
individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering 
take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective 
mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics. 
The gathering has thus become what, in the absence of a better expression, I will call an 
organized crowd, or, if the term is considered preferable, a psychological crowd. It forms 
a single being and is subject to the law of the mental unity of crowds. (p. 46) 
 
For Le Bon, who had witnessed the Paris Commune, the rise of Georges Ernest Boulanger, and 
the Dreyfus Affair, some events were able to galvanize a multiplicity of elements and ultimately lead to the 
mobilization of large segments of the population. In such cases, he suggested, people behave differently 
as individuals than when they are in a group. 
 
6DPSVRQ  SRLQWV RXW WKDW LQ DQ DJH RI LQWHUDFWLYLW\ WKLV ³PHPH´ HIIHFW WUDQVFHQGV WKH
physical boundaries and can spread more widely and faster. Therefore, given the right conditions, a 
protest can become an epidemic in a matter of hours, taking on a life of its own. This does not, however, 
preclude agency from the different participants. On the contrary, the virality metaphor suggests that the 
protests acquire their own agenda and dynamics through imitation among individuals, which would explain 
why the protests in Venezuela grew so quickly despite the leaders of the opposition lacking the political 
appeal to mobilize the protests. (When the leaders of the opposition, Leopoldo López and María Corina 
Machado, initially called for people to protest in the streets, few heeded their call.)  
 
Sampson argues that, in certain cases, empathy becomes a means of contagion, which indicates 
that emotionality can play a key role in protests.1 Far from an indictment of lack of consciousness among 
students and members of the public when joining these protests, the metaphor of virality/contagion 
reminds us of the false dichotomy between rationality/irrationality and rationality/emotionality in relation 
to human political behavior. In this context, the students were seen as legitimate protesters and as 
acceptable role models (drawing parallels with British youngsters joining ISIS nowadays). The fact that 
their words and actions spread through Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube only added to that legitimacy of 
participating in these protests, because there was no apparent mediation between them and the general 
public who could listen and see them directly.  
 
Sampson (2012) also suggests that the process of contagion is temporary and that it declines 
and dies, just as a virus does. This temporality means that the contagion effect subsides over a relatively 
short period of time²which would explain why the student protests decelerated their spread after some 
weeks and then declined until stalling. However, this is not an entirely satisfactory explanation; heavy-
handed police and military intervention to crack down on the protesters, the imprisonment of key 
                                                 
1 It is important to clarify that by using the notion of contagion, Sampson is not passing judgment, despite 
the usual negative connotations of the word. Rather, he is using the word contagion it to metaphorically 
describe certain patterns of behavior. 
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opposition leaders, and a sustained media campaign to criminalize and delegitimize the students had 
perhaps a more crucial part in the waning of the protests. 
 
It is also possible, according to some journalists covering the events, that the prolonged 
perception of anarchy and disorder was in itself a driving force for the protesters losing legitimacy in the 
public eye and was a motive for many to withdraw from the protests. Rogelio Suárez, journalist and news 
editor of the Radio Fe y Alegría broadcast network in the west of Venezuela, points out: 
 
There was a sense after a while that it was too much, that the protests were going 
nowhere. That the guarimbas were only making things worse. After a while, the protests 
themselves became, in the eyes of many people, the problem. (personal communication, 
November 10, 2014) 
 
Here the metaphor of virus is also useful, because collective perceptions can also halt imitation 
once they reach a saturation level in which the host body is killed. The analogy here is clear: The host 
body in this case is a public sphere that experiences information overload, leading to disengagement of 
individuals.  
 
'HVSLWH WKHRUHWLFDO OLPLWDWLRQV 6DPSVRQ¶V DSSURDFK FDQ KHOS XV EHWWHU XQGHUVWDQG ZK\ WKH
SURWHVWVVSUHDGVRIDVWDQGWRVRPDQ\SODFHVVLPXOWDQHRXVO\0HDQZKLOH0F1DLU¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWLQWKH
age of cultural chaos the new media ecology can enhance distribution of content by bringing complexity 
into the equation also help us understand why this contagion became possible in the first place in a 
country where mainstream media spaces as institutional channels to express discontent were becoming 
increasingly curtailed by political polarization and government censorship. 
 
Blackout and Beyond 
 
By 2014, the Venezuelan government exercised control over most of the mainstream media, and 
it had a firm grip SDUWLFXODUO\RQWKHEURDGFDVWLQJVHFWRU%LVEDO&DxL]iOH]³(O*RELHUQRGH
+XJR &KiYH]´   ,W GLG VR PRVWO\ E\ UHIRUPXODWLQJ WKH OHJDO IUDPHZRUN WKDW UHJXODWHG PHGLD
RZQHUVKLSDQGEURDGFDVWOLFHQVHV5DPtUH]$OYDUDGR³DOORFDWLQJDlmost discretionally government 
DGYHUWLVLQJ´ &DxL]iOH]  S  DQG DFFHVV WR KDUG FXUUHQF\ WR EX\SDSHU HTXLSPHQW DQG VSDUH
parts (EFE, 2014). Where media control was not possible, the government used the judicial system to 
prosecute media owners and journalists (La Federación Internacional de Periodistas, 2009) while 
supporting and encouraging the buyout of oppositional media outlets by groups and individuals with close 
OLQNVWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW³6LOYLD$OHJUHWW´  
 
Our data suggest that the mainstream media effectively tried to minimize the student protests, 
as is standard practice in most societies. A sample of stories published in the newspapers El Nacional, 
Últimas Noticias, and el Correo del Orinoco during the months of the protests (February to April) reveals 
that the protests did not receive as much coverage as one might expect. Even in El Nacional, the only one 
of the three newspapers that identifies itself openly with the opposition, just 46% of the stories about the 
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protests had a picture, and only 36% made it to the front page. More importantly, all three newspapers 
articulated their stories using politicians and government officials as main sources instead of the students.  
 
The broadcast media also downplayed the protests. Examining audiovisual archives from two key 
television channels, Venevisión and Televen, during March 2014, it is possible to see that coverage of the 
protests was limited to the news segments and to brief sections of these. Although there are interviews 
with leaders of the opposition and human rights activists, students are all but absent in these reports. 
Both Venevisión and Televen claim to be the independent channels and portray their reporting as 
unbiased. Nevertheless, our sample of their coverage of these events suggests that the use of official 
sources and the invisibilization of the actual protests were characteristics of the news coverage in those 
days.  
 
In terms of audience reach, the overall news media landscape failed to connect with the type of 
decentralized politics that are popular among younger people. Therefore, it is not surprising that both the 
students and important segments of the public relied more on social media to learn what was really 
happening. Research carried out just after these events indicates that the use of social media provisions 
VXFKDV7ZLWWHU³LQFUHDVHGVLJQLILFDQWO\GXULQJWKHGD\VRIWKHSURWHVWV´$UHQDV	'HOJDGRS
This body of research suggests that the increased use of Twitter and Facebook also saw a politicization in 
the nature of the messages being exchanged. Not only were people using more social media; they were 
using it to discuss and exchange political messages. 
 
There is, in addition, evidence that social media was used to create a space of protection against 
SROLFHEUXWDOLW\LQDPDQQHUVLPLODUWRHYHQWVLQWKHSDVWZKHQWKHXQLYHUVLWLHV¶DXWRQRPLFVSDFHVRIIHUHG
refuge for protesters. For Melanio Escobar²a Twitter user who became prominent during the student 
protests as he gathered and published the names, pictures, and locations of people being detained by the 
police, the national guard, and the intelligence services²the question was simple: 
 
I felt that unless we gathered and published the names of those being detained, 
something could happen to them. In South America we have a long tradition of 
disappearances, people who are arrested and then vanish forever. (personal 
communication, November 21, 2014) 
 
Escobar explains also that the use of Twitter and Facebook grew in part because it also became a 
system of self-defense: 
 
Those of us who were taking part in the protests noticed from the start that it was in 
those marches and situations in which there were no journalists present in which most 
of the deaths in the hands of the police occurred. These deaths happened during 
protests in which there was no one reporting in social media. In fact, there is no trace of 
'DQLHO7LQRFR¶V [a 24-year-old student at the University of Táchira] assassination nor of 
Robert Redman [a 31-year-old recently graduated pilot]. There is no evidence or public 
register of the deaths of Génesis [a 23-year-old model and student at University of 
Carabobo] or Adriana Urquiola [a 28-year-old sign language interpreter for a local 
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television network]. We also notice that when people were filming or taking pictures, the 
police and the armed forces seemed to behave in a more constrained manner regarding 
the use of force. It then became obvious that we had to gather and disseminate this 
information. That meant asking people in the marches to take pictures and record 
footage with their mobile devices and then upload them to the Internet using social 
media. Once that was there, we all started to tweet so people could become aware of 
what was happening. (personal communication, November 21, 2014)  
 
According to Escobar, the use of social media was not only a matter of dissemination; it 
responded to the need to reduce uncertainty and anxiety among the families of the students who had 
been arrested or injured, 
 
I personally visited Fuerte Tiuna2 and other places. I managed to compile the names of 
nearly 3,000 people who had been detained. I published their names²and in many 
cases, their pictures, thanks to amateur photographers in the place. Thanks to that, 
families, relatives, and friends of those under arrest were able to know where their loved 
ones were being held. I also know that other Twitter users did similar things from the 
hospitals and even from the morgues. The whole point was to reduce uncertainty and 
anxiety among the public. LeW¶V UHPHPEHU WKDW WKHUH ZDV OLWHUDOO\ D EODFNRXW RI WKH
mainstream media, and social media was the only channel we had to communicate these 
things. (personal communication, November 21, 2014) 
 
3HRSOH DOVR XVHG VRFLDO PHGLD ³WR VHW WKH UHFRUG VWUDLJKW´  -RVé Leonardo León Avendaño²a 
broadcast journalist who is managing news director of the radio network Circuito Radial de la Universidad 
de los Andes and a part-time stringer for Thomson Reuters in the city of Mérida, where some of the 
biggest and more intense protests took place²explains what he saw those days: 
 
People were using Twitter to disseminate the pictures of who were causing the vandalism 
and the destruction of property. It was not the students, but the pro-government groups 
called colectivos. These quasi-paramilitary groups, heavily armed and protected by the 
police itself, patrolled the city searching for protesters while vandalizing houses, 
buildings, and offices. People wanted to show what was really happening because this 
was not being reported by the mainstream media. They felt perhaps that at least in that 
way they were showing the impunity with which these people were acting. (personal 
communication, November 21, 2014) 
 
The universities as institutions played a role in disseminating the messages about the protests, 
although indirectly. As Rogelio Suárez, a radio journalist based in Maracaibo points out: 
 
                                                 
2 Fuerte Tiuna is the main headquarters for the armed forces, and it became a massive detention center 
during the student protests. 
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It was curious to notice, for example, that the three main universities in the state of 
Zulia²URBE, LUZ, and UNICA²were constantly updating information to their students 
and staff members using their official Twitter accounts. In these updates they informed 
people when they were open, when they were closed²one could assume because of 
protests²or in which of their campuses there were particular problems. In so doing, 
they were practically mapping the geography of the protests, so if someone wanted to 
go, they knew exactly where to go. There is no doubt in my mind that the use of the 
institutional social media accounts by these universities gave indirectly information 
about the protests. There were also unofficial accounts of groups or individuals closely 
linked to these universities who not only provided similar information but went beyond 
to give far more details. (personal communication, November 10, 2014)  
 
These descriptions of the increase in the use of the social media at the time do not explain why 
the contagion effect happened so quickly. Why did it translate into political action among so many in such 
a short period of time? Iria Puyosa RIIHUVDSRVVLEOH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ IRU WKLV ³7KHSURSDJDWLRQRI
SROLWLFDO LGHDV KDSSHQVRQO\ZKHQ D FULWLFDOPDVVRI QRGV JHWV FRQQHFWHG´ S  ,Q RWKHUZRUGV WKH
digital platforms provided an opportunity for the protesters to reach that critical mass, after which the 
protests became viral. Puyosa argues that, thanks to the connections among the critical mass, political 
ideas can bypass the barriers created by polarization, which, until then, had prevented each side from 
UHDFKLQJWKHRWKHU¶VFRQVWituencies. 
 
Puyosa, nonetheless, also warns that it was not possible to identify a core leadership in the 
SURWHVWV %HWZHHQ )HEUXDU\ DQG $SULO  DV VKH SRLQWV RXW ³ZKHQ SHRSOH WRRN WR WKH VWUHHWV WKH
politicians and student leaders tried in vain to iQWHUSUHWWKHDFWLRQVLQDFRKHUHQWPDQQHU´S,QGHHG
the movement failed to create or even to set the basis for a more collective identity that could respond to 
the discontent that led to the protests in the first place. Because of the lack of cohesion²or centrality²the 
temporality of the movement was sealed. According to Luis Carlos Díaz: 
 
The use of social media during the student protests amplified the scandal and stirred the 
anger and frustration against the government. But at the end it failed to articulate a civil 
DJHQGD WKDW VRPHKRZ ZDV DEOH WR V\QWKHVL]H SHRSOH¶V DVSLUDWLRQV DQG GHPDQGV 
(personal communication, November 11, 2014) 
 
Does this mean that without political rationality²following emotional contagion/virality²it is not 
possible to achieve a more permanent change or long-standing agenda? No, because participation by 
means of emotional imitation can also lead to rational innovation in politics. For Sampson (2012), who is 
coming from a cultural studies perspective, it is precisely imitation that allows society to create new 
things. By this he means that once contagion occurs and is replicated among many, there will be variance, 
and it is from this variance that we can expect change and innovation. 
 
This variance, in the case of Venezuela, can mean new forms of doing politics and engaging with 
the public. Student participation, at least partially, did occur by imitation, and it meant that thousands 
became politicized in ways in which they were not previously. People are starting to discover new ways of 
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political engagement. The question, however, is: What type of engagement are they learning under these 
circumstances? For Jesús Urbina²journalist, blogger, and a professor of media studies at the Universidad 
del Zulia: 
 
What the use of Twitter and Facebook showed during the protests is that their use 
reflected in many ways some of the worst aspects of our own political culture. If you 
think about it, they were not used to articulate spaces for democratic dialogue and 
cohabitation. Instead, they were used to design bubbles of contestation, making it even 
more difficult to speak to each other, which is what democratic society ought to be 
doing²at least in those areas in which dialogue could bring some sort of shared view of 
the future. Instead, social media was used in the same manner we tend to use 
television, newspapers, and the rest of the traditional media: to further delimit our own 
spaces. (personal communication, November 10, 2014) 
 
Indeed, if social media has brought innovation in terms of political engagement, the key problem 
remains: the absence of spaces for dialogue in which people can exchange ideas, views, and shared 
interests.  
 
Conclusion 
 
At no point has been our intention to suggest that the student protests in Venezuela can be solely 
explained by psychology or techno-deterministic perspectives, which remain the key characteristics of 
virality and cultural chaos as theoretical approaches. On the contrary, we have tried to highlight their 
profound limitations as explanatory frameworks. However, we did find the virality and cultural chaos 
approaches useful as instruments of argumentative provocation, which, as Niklas Luhmann (1995) noted, 
can be crucial to opening new understandings. Neither are we saying that these technologies either hinder 
GLDORJXHRUIRVWHUDPRUHLQFOXVLYHSXEOLFVSKHUHSHUVH,WKDVEHHQLQVWHDGXVHUV¶SUDFWLFHVDQGSROLWLFDO
culture, characterized by extreme polarization and violence, which have stopped political dialogue from 
happening among the different actors.  
 
Our argument has been carried out to explore the power of those using these technologies for 
fostering emotional links among participants and for participation and civic engagement in ways that 
Venezuela had not seen for years. This is a process tKDW-HIIUH\6-XULVKDVFDOOHGWKH³HPHUJLQJ
ORJLFRIDJJUHJDWLRQ´SZKLFKLVDEOHWRDVVHPEOHPDVVHVRILQGLYLGXDOVIURPGLYHUVHEDFNJURXQGV
within physical spaces. We have suggested that this logic of aggregation can happen also in 
metageographical terms. In light of this, we call for future research to explore how to make social media a 
space in which we all learn and innovate through the imitation of dialogue rather than an extended trench 
for propaganda and polarization.  
 
At this point, is worth revisiting the history of the first democratic spaces for dialogue that were 
FUHDWHG LQ /DWLQ $PHULFD ³:KHQ XQLYHUVLWLHV ZHUH DZDUGHG DXWRQRP\ IUHH IURP FHQWUDO JRYHUQPHQW
LQWHUYHQWLRQ WKLV ZDV GRQH WR JLYH WKHP WKH IUHHGRP WR GHEDWH LGHDV´ Cordero, 1959, p. 8). Indeed, 
since the university reform in Cordoba (Argentina) of 1918, this autonomy was understood not only as 
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geographical spaces protected from central power intervention but as a metageographically encounter for 
dialogue, knowledge, and political participation among individuals. In these spaces, academics were given 
autonomy to teach and research, and students were encouraged to imitate that same contestation to 
power and advance democratic citizenship. It is perhaps time, then, that we learn from these lessons and 
use social media to develop spaces for autonomic dialogue in which people and governments can engage 
with ideas and views without feeling excluded or threatened and in which imitation truly translates into 
democratic innovation. 
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